"I am... proposing to take new powers to enable dangerous and high-risk offenders to be better managed... The plans which we have recently announced to amend mental health legislation will help to ensure that mentally disordered offenders get the treatment they need and that the risk which they pose to the public is minimised..." 6
This is an idealised win-win scenario. It suggests that offenders are thus detained for their own sake and the protection of others. That is not what the Mental Health Act says. Rather, patients can be detained for their own health and safety or for the protection of other people. The Mental Health Act -before and after the reform of 2007 -provides for psychiatric detention purely on the grounds of dangerousness.
Both perceptions are true: violence by mentally disordered people represents a minority of crimes but a small number of serious offences remain the high-profile work of seriously disturbed (mainly) men. Policy thus has to tackle stigma and public protection. The question here is whether policy addresses not merely actual but also perceived danger, an inflation resulting in the lawful but unnecessary detention of people whose human rights are inadequately protected by domestic or Convention law.
Though Parliament has not inhibited assaults on civil liberties 7 and the Courts have shown an uneven resistance, 8 there are checks on centralised control. Indeed, the Labour administration showed no coherent purpose of increasing such control, in its first term incorporating the ECHR in the Human Rights Act 1998 and passing the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
Nevertheless, thresholds of detention have been falling under criminal and mental health law. That fall relies significantly on public fear. After every public-authority-related tragedy, even while the seeds of future tragedies continue to be sown, the same meaningless mantra is mouthed: 'it must never happen again'. Where detention is concerned, a sense of entitlement to a uniquely risk-free society combines with denial of the limitations of risk prediction to produce an uncritical appetite for control, or 'management'. 10 Following rather than engaging with media reactions, politicians help to create a climate within which borderline discharge decisions become ever more difficult.
In relation to criminal law, the Labour government legitimised an expansion of prison populations by arguing that the policy is '"protecting the public from thousands of offences a year which might otherwise The specific outcome was to legitimise the indefinite detention of 12 men diagnosed with 'psychopathic personality disorders' and assessed as highly dangerous, but not amenable to lawful imprisonment or assessed as treatable; the 'own interests' argument, with no place in mental health law, can be little more than a paternalistic attempt at moral justification.
The problem here is not the (uncontentious) assertion that some mentally disordered people may be 'occasionally dangerous', but the suggested presumption of such a connection. A similar carelessness -or prejudice -marks his judgment a little earlier: "One of the immediate concerns which one has about such persons is that of public safety..." 19 It is a presumption which one-sidedly weights the evidence needed for courts balancing the interests of mentally disordered people and public safety, and which gives authority to popular fears.
The judiciary is not blind to its relationship with popular fear. The Parole Board in 1977 agonised over the extent to which its decisions on notorious prisoners should be influenced by public opinion; its 1986 Report 'felt it necessary to spell out that public perceptions were part of the risk assessment process with the Board taking into account "the degree of abhorrence with which society regards that offence and the likely public reaction to the offender's early release from custody". This can be contrasted with the longstanding principle that public reaction is not relevant to judicial sentencing and release decisions.' 20 That principle is spelt out by Goff LJ in the Venables and Thompson case: "I wish to draw a distinction... between public concern of a general nature with regard to, for example, the prevalence of certain types of offence, and the need that those who commit such offences should be duly punished; and public clamour that a particular offender whose case is under consideration should be singled out for severe punishment. It is legitimate for a sentencing authority to take the former concern into account, but not the latter". 21 It is a principle deserving closer consideration in political as well as judicial contexts. 22 Governments shrink from confronting populist fears, being characteristically unwilling to open up discussion of the limits of risk assessment or of the complex relationship between incarceration and risk reduction. The former administration's simultaneous desire to present the DoH anti-stigma campaign made incoherence inevitable. One had to take centre stage; the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) won. The Coalition government has not indicated any shift in this balance.
Levels of detention
What is the evidence to support government's enthusiasm for preventive detention? One needs to look The Mental Health Tribunal is the Article 5(4) reviewing 'court' for people detained under the MHA and covered by Article 5(1)(e). A criterion for MHA detention is an undefined need for 'the protection of other persons'. 48 Under that provision, there is a yet more serious loss of connection -that between detention and treatment, even for the symptoms of mental disorder; 49 to lose that link would be to accept that psychiatry had become an overt means of control.
After 1983, the scope of the original provision of detention solely for the protection of others was gradually extended by the judiciary. 50 The battle for reform finally producing the MHA 2007 challenged that extension: referring to an earlier Bill but making an argument pertinent to the final Act, the Mental Health Alliance was 'particularly disturbed by the over-emphasis in the Bill on protection of the public from "dangerous" people and the disastrous impact this will have on those people it targets and on the vast majority of mental health patients who pose no danger to anyone. 'treatment', 53 merely confirmed judicial extension of the law. 54 During the passage of the MHA 2007, the Mental Health Act Commission expressed concern that detention could be legitimised by merely intended benefit to the disorder or its symptoms without evidence of likely benefit. It cited the draft Code of Practice, case-law and Jones to argue that individual 'best interests' should remain a criterion, 55 but the published Code contained no such reference. Indeed, while under the Code 'Simply detaining someone -even in a hospital -does not constitute medical treatment', detaining that person with nursing and 'specialist day-to-day care' under clinical supervision and in a 'safe and secure therapeutic environment with a structured regime' does. 56 It is a largely semantic distinction.
The Code follows the case-law. 57 cited above is Lord Clyde's assertion of the power under MHA 1983 and the EHRC to detain people for the sake of public protection on the basis of their mental disorder and in the absence of treatment. That judgment followed Ashingdane, where only the minority judgment emphasised the difference in purpose between imprisonment and hospital detention, the latter involving the '…duty of the executive... to strive after the means most likely to bring a cure....' 58 The majority followed Winterwerp in ruling that the right to appropriate treatment could not be derived from Article 5(1)(e). 59 For Lady Hale, the indefinite confinement of capable and untreatable non-criminals under MHA could not be a 'justifiable discrimination'; she deplored Strasbourg's refusal to define 'unsound mind' in Article 5(1)(e) and thus restrict its potential abuse. 60 Her concern mirrored that of the Mental Health Alliance. 61 This lack of clear definition of 'mental disorder' or 'appropriate treatment', including the distinction between detention in a therapeutic 'milieu' and mere containment, continues to exercise judges. Unfortunately, their rulings remain so hedged about by 'if', 'may', 'might' and other qualifiers that their call to Tribunals to apply the statutory conditions to the specifics of each case produces more appearance than reality of safeguard. 62 Lack of definition remains a mighty weapon. 
Prison or hospital?
If people can be detained purely for the protection of others under criminal and mental health law, what is the distinction between them?
In principle, and probably in practice in terms of the experiential difference between even a HSH and a high-security prison, there is a profound distinction in terms of the institutions' rationale and the motivations and professional ethos of the detaining authorities. Hoggett, now Lady Hale, is a prime proponent of a principled difference between the two regimes. 'The gulf between pure preventive detention and some sort of medical care and treatment may be very narrow, but it is nonetheless deep...; although she also makes it clear that a gulf so narrow is liable to be bridged. 63 Dyson LJ subsequently spelled out the 'subtle yet important differences' between Tribunal and Board. Before the Tribunal, '[w]hile risk to the public is a factor it is not determinative in the absence of evidence that the patient meets the criteria for detention in hospital under the Act'. Before the Parole Board, 'primacy of risk' to the public must be respected. 64 Hallett LJ insists on the principle that 'the Mental Health Act regime under a hospital order focuses on reducing the risk of a recurrence of mental illness as opposed to reducing the risk of re-offending...' 65 Parallel reasoning holds for restricted patients: the judiciary must resist any temptation to see a transfer direction as a means of prolonging penal detention. 66 Though restriction-direction patients continue to serve their sentence while detained in hospital, psychiatric detention is not (in principle) punitive. So at least Lady Hale argues, commenting on the tendency of Strasbourg to treat psychiatric hospital and prison together and referencing her own Appeal Court ruling in Munjaz on their different purposes. 67 Sentencing courts must therefore (try to) 68 distinguish where on the gradient a law-breaker stands: between offences directly attributable to a mental disorder and those where, despite such a disorder, the causal link is 'diminished' or absent. 69 At the one end lies a hospital order, probably with restriction; 70 at the other a prison sentence, even if a transfer/restriction direction is subsequently needed; 71 in the middle a hospital/limitation direction. 72 Such complexities make for effectively arbitrary disposals. The MHA 2007 has removed the separate provisions for mental illness and 'psychopathic disorder'. But legal and clinical understandings of mental disorder continue to differ, driven by different agendas. 73 In Murray, sentencing guidelines and M'Naghton Rules enforced a penal disposal, though the Appeal Court subsequently moved the claimant to hospital. 74 However, the rules remain open to the influence of fear: either hospital or prison can be chosen as providing the longest and securest sentence. Thus the MHAC disapprovingly cited the refusal of the sentencing judge to send Nicky Reilly (diagnosed with Asperger's syndrome and learning disability) for assessment in Broadmoor before passing a life sentence. 75 In Simpson, the Appeal Court overturned the original prison disposal primarily on the grounds not of the offender's treatability, but because 'the best chance of minimising the danger lies in a Hospital Order…'. While Toulson LJ spoke of the (dim) hope of rehabilitation through medical treatment, the security implications were decisive. 76 The situation was even clearer in IA, where the sentencing judge handed down a life sentence in the 'hope and expectation' that Mr IA would be detained in hospital; however, 'little or nothing appeared to [be] done to effect the transfer'. 77
It is partly a question of supply and demand. Given that prison beds are uniquely available on demand whatever the overcrowding, many prisoners assessed as needing hospital are not transferred. 78 The ruling in IH is interesting: continued detention of a patient potentially fit for conditional discharge is not unlawful where the 'nature' criterion is satisfied and where no appropriate community provision is available. 79 The funding priorities of PCTs and local government thus define the limits of lawful detention. 80 So while prisons bulge with mentally disordered inmates, beds in secure units and HSHs are occupied by patients 'sectioned' more for security than health reasons. AT indicates the readiness with which Hoggett's 'gulf' can be bridged by the use of hospital as place of indefinite preventive detention. 81 Personality hitherto deemed 'untreatable' can now be transferred under that same Act, and detained indefinitely. 83 In TF, the Appeal Court ruled that a transfer direction effected in September 2008, just before MHA 2007 was implemented and on the eve of young TF's release, was under s47(1)(b) unlawful in the absence of adequate medical evidence; the SoS' eleventh-hour attempt to continue detaining that personalitydisordered offender had been one degree too clumsy. 85 The rationale of recalls is similarly blurred. The SoS can recall a conditionally discharged patient though his disorder is not of the statutory 'degree' for initial detention 'because the combination of the patient's mental disorder and his behaviour makes it necessary' for public safety. 86 The recall decision depends only 'partly' on medical advice, 'comparatively minor irregularities of behaviour or failure to cooperate with supervisors being sufficient'; though behaviour unconnected with the mental disorder does not merit the 'sanction' of recall, 'the decision will always give precedence to public safety considerations' -a powerful catch-all. 87 The SoS apparently regards recall as a 'sanction' though its role is non-punitive.
But perhaps the most revealing indicator of an effectively arbitrary executive use of detention is the MoJ's range of responses when a conditionally discharged patient is reconvicted and sentenced to prison. '[T]he SoS will often reserve judgement on the patient's status under the Mental Health Act 1983 until he nears the end of his prison sentence, when he will seek fresh medical evidence....', on the basis of which he may allow conditional discharge to resume, direct immediate recall to hospital or authorise absolute discharge. 88 The 'need' for hospital is again provoked only by the proximity of release. 89 Optimists in search of rationales based on criminogenic or therapeutic priorities may despair. The Board's judgments on criminogenic risk can face executive challenge on the grounds that the offender's mental health renders its evidence unsafe, thus challenging the validity of its specialist work. 90 Meanwhile, the SoS' focus on immediate risk-avoidance must be deeply frustrating for courts aware that for some personalities, continued detention and over-stringent risk management on release increase longer-term risks of reoffending. 91 Again, the Tribunal may review pre-tariff lifer restriction-direction patients whose detention may have no therapeutic or a counter-therapeutic effect, without effective power to discharge them: that lies with the Board. The discharge of post-tariff lifers under restriction directions, assessed by the Tribunal as ready for conditional discharge into the community but not back to prison, may be indefinitely blocked by a Board wary of their lack of criminogenic course-work or testing in open prison. 92 Tribunal members clinging to belief in the MHA's therapeutic rationale will be troubled by the evidence in A and Others of the psychological impact of indefinite detention. 93 Anderson presents the incoherences starkly. His disorder having been assessed as untreatable, Mr Anderson could not be held in a prison hospital wing because (unsurprisingly) no treatment was available for him; he could nevertheless be indefinitely detained in hospital. Furthermore, while he required hospitalisation because he was too dangerous to be held in prison, assessment of his dangerousness was deemed to be beyond the Tribunal's sole remit. 94 Thus while the Board can grant parole to mentally disordered prisoners who have (randomly) avoided restriction directions, the Tribunal cannot free restriction direction patients. The logic is comprehensible given that the criminal sentence has priority as the detaining rationale: Article 5(1)(a) rather than 5(1)(e). But since the Board's task of risk assessment is shared by restricted patient Tribunal panels in addition to their mental health responsibilities, it seems absurd for these Tribunals with their 'exalted membership' not to have the power of release. 95 The situation is a looking-glass land of situations whose essential likeness is revealed yet divided by law.
Perhaps the least adequately defined of all prisoners and patients are the 'personality disordered', 96 whose situation encapsulates the potential arbitrariness of the dual system. 'Why does he keep committing crimes? Because he is a psychopath. How do you know he's a psychopath? Because he keeps committing crimes.' 97 It is the next twist which is deadly: the 'extent to which abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct now occurs may throw light on whether there is a psychopathic disorder, but the disorder may still exist, even if there has been no such conduct for several years.' 98 How do you know he's a psychopath? Because he used to be seriously irresponsible.
The problem has two sub-divisions. One is the legitimacy in principle of indeterminate preventive detention. The other is the lack of any clear division between incontrovertibly dangerous 'psychopaths' and other personality disordered individuals. For Lord Bradley, the government's DSPD programme (for dangerous and severe personality disordered people) was a positive step towards treating the hitherto 'untreatable' PD population. 99 Others are more suspicious. For them it is a confirmation of all that is prejudiced and stigmatising; 100 categorisation as undefined and clinically unrecognised. 103 DSPD has been described as a 'monster' created by government as a precursor to 'draconian legislative powers', which though not themselves materialising had an equivalent in IPP. 104 Moncrieff has a parallel concern, focused on the treatment of patients restricted for a wide variety of reasons 'as if they were restricted for the same reason -the protection of the public from serious harm.' 105 In a culture in which indefinite detention has become legally normalised, lack of definition permits 'dangerousness' to become the scientist's despair: an unfalsifiable proposition and a statement of prejudice and aversion. 106
Conclusion
Moral cowardice lay at the heart of the previous government's discussion and formulation of policy on dangerous individuals. The British Association of Social Workers noted the contrast between the extension of compulsory powers to include personality disordered patients under the Mental Health Bill 2007 with the lack of actual funds for treatment of such disorders, in hospital or the community. 107 It is hard to make sense of government policy save by recognising its desire to be seen as tough on crime and disorder and the individuals which exemplify them, without needing to take on the long-term expenditure needed to address the needs of electorally unrewarding social misfits.
Compulsion, whether in hospital or in the community, is a policy of containment which minimises costs while maximising electoral advantage. Were the motives otherwise, the DoH anti-stigma campaign, supported by coherent policies of health and social care, would be at the forefront of political selfpresentation and funds, not the MoJ's crime and disorder agenda. For the policy rides in the face of evidence that popular fears legitimate unnecessarily harsh legislation and counter-productively cautious decision-making on sentencing and release. 108 Concern about the implications of this legal situation for effectively arbitrary detention need not rest on any political judgment about the intentions of the last or present government. Legal safeguards exist to protect us against potential as well as actual danger; when abuse ceases to be potential, it is probably too late to guard against it. Therein lies the inadequacy of denying the threat to civil liberties posed by recent terrorism legislation on the grounds of government's benign intentions.
Challenges to populist myths about the equations of mental disorder and crime with dangerousness by one part of government are swamped by executive pronouncements, statute and case-law which validate them. Fantasies about a risk-free society are politically manipulated. Lawful powers exist and are exercised to detain people indefinitely and preventively; such detention can be maximised by the selective use of mental health and criminal law. The ECHR provides protection against abuses, but is generous in its definition of the lawful.
The problem of dangerous anti-social behaviour is real, and the balance to be struck between individual freedom and public safety demands continuing debate. But such conversation must involve more imaginative consideration of how a society can deal with its own 'brokenness', less fear-driven approaches to mental disorder and more historical awareness of the significance of civil liberties.
